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REVISION A
1. REQUIRERER~S: P~ra~r~fh 1.0 15TBDDDCTIOH ••••••• Tbe space
S~uttle systea, including the ~ehlc!e and all
facilities uhere major t9StS or operations are
~~rforoed~ sball be de~i9ned to accept the
li9ht~iDg flasb, as d~fined in this document,
directly to the sJ9te~ during eith~r praflig,bt
or in{liqht operation~ uitbout &ffecting any
equip.ent in suck a eanner as to enaaoger
persDI:llnel safety ~ mission success, 1:»1: to delay
& lA~Dch•••••••••
Paragraph 2,1 LIGHTUING EHTRY/EIIT rOINTS
(LAaleR I~D OESCEMT PHASES). The most likely
119htniD~ l!':ntr'i/edt. points for the launcb
phase an,&thCll de~""i1.\t phase are sbotln in
Pi9ures 2-1 and 2-2 respectively.
P&1:i!<jlCaph 3.1.14.1 V\'!ftlicle eat.l:eDiti.-tI$. both
aetallic nnd non-~otallic. shall witbstand the
full ~odel lightning flasb wit hoot sustaining
daaa~m t~~t would Ca~Ge ~ ~alfunctiDn th~t
vculG resu1t in the loss of the vehicle. ion-
Iletal.lic sU:I:~:aces sbil'.ll either be sll,pplied
v;'th ~lI:t.er:i.,mr. cur'C'ont-con-'ilicting pat.hs. or
shall deDollstrate, the intrinsic caplllbility to
vitnstand tlil~ liglltnill<j flash. Thos;e areas of
the vehicle ear which the state-of-the art
cannot prov1.do prc)tectioD eh,Qll :;,.; teSl:.'in! to
determine the op€ra~ional constraints.
DEVIATION:
AUTHORITY:
AUTHORITY:
Por: liqhtniln<j dire,ct effect dfJsign.tho
E,,:ternal 'rQmk Li!2 <lnd L02 tanks and the 1,02
ta:l(r pr_!ssuJ:'b:a-;:ion\ line shall be required to
withstand ~he lightning Bode' second o~ sUb-
sf/Ciuent retarll stroke lI.ttar.:hments onl.y a-ad
these at a aini.uQ vebiele velocity of 64
ft/sec.
Leyel II ~ICBD S02365 dated. 1/25/76
P&cagraph 3.2.1 SHIELDIMG ••• ~ •••• oYer~ll cable
shields s~all ba continuous uitbout br9aks or
splices~ expect at connectors and ~t branch
points on cables ulth aultiple br.eatout~. The
ove~all shield, as a ~ini.u., ~hall he
grounded to bQlkhead metallic structure or
eqQipD~nt ground at each eD~. Interaediate
9rQundi~9 say be used.
Splices of E~ overall harness sblelds ~hall be
allow~ld•
. I.el'el II Pr.CBD S02385 dated, 1/25/76
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3. Sign and date this page in th~ space provided belo~ to sho~
that these changes have been incorporated and tile i90ediately
behind Re?isioDs/Chaoge Page.
Date
This document has been app~oved by the Space Shuttle prcyram
Office and is available fo~ use by NASA and associated
contractors.
Changes and revisions to this document shall be accomplished in
accordance with the Level II Baseline change Frocedures
established by JSC 01700, Volume IV, Confi9uration Management.
Robert F. Thompson
Manager, Space Shuttle Prog~am
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1.0 I NT ROt-UC'rION • 'i'h~ Space Shuttle vehicle l:iIc..y experience
lightning in flight eYen thougb launch restrictions vill be
imposed. In ddditiob o the system ~ill be exposed to lightning on
the ground and possibly during other ~ission phases.
CD TIle Space Shuttle systeB, incluCling the vehicle aod all facili-
ties where major tests or aperations are perfor.med, shall be
designed to accept the lightninl} flash, as defined in this
document, directly to the system during either preflight or
inflight operations uithout affecting any eqUipment in such a
m~nner dS to endanger personnel safety, mission success, or to
d.-elay a launch.
This document defines the lightning envircnaent for design and
i~poses the requirements tb~t th~ design ~ust satisfy to insure
the protection of the Spac~ Shuttle wehicie SYSt3= f~o= ~he
diract and indirect effects of lightning. Specifications,
cd.tarta, and <juideliQes inclnded in th~.s docueent provide a
pr.actlcal nnd logical approach to the flrotect ion problellls.
Protection against the ~ndirect effects of lightning is
inti_ateI! involved with the electroaa~netic cogpatLbility and
electrouaqnetic interference func~ioDs. While this doc"oent does
not deal specifically ~ith electromagnetic compatibility and
electromagnetic interferenCe, it does deal with the interactions
between li1htning protection aeasures and _easures employed for
electromagnetic cOIlpat.ibility and control of electrollagnet.lc
interference.
I~ cases of conflict bet~een the contents of this 4oCU8snt and
other specifications or criteria relating to lightning
protection, this document shall govern. Deviations shall be
sranted only upon the CODcurrenc~ ot t~e ~igbtnin9 Protection
Co~mittee and tbe approval of tbe Sp~ce Shuttle Configuration
Control Board LeYel II.
Tho ~ords eay, shall, and shoUld have a specific meaning in this
docu.~nt. See Appendix G for definition.
1.1 CRlNGE P20C2DORE. Delegated representati~es of the National
Aeronauti~s ana S~4ce Adainistration; Johnson Space Cent.er,
Harshall Sp~ce Flight Center, Kennedy Space Center; United States
~ir Porce Space and ~~S5ile Systeas organization (LVB); aDd
Rock~ell International shall be points of cont~ct for pror~sad
changes tbrough t.b.~ U.ghtnillg P.rotection COllllitt.ee. FigurE' 1-1
is a listing of aath~~ized rep~esentatjves and Figure 1-2 is a
s.saple of the reguir:ed alllendaeDt. forp..
CDBefer to the De.iation/~ai.er Page in front of the docu~ent.
1-1 CHANGE NO.2
After Lig~tniDg protection Coeaittee coordination, all proposed
changes shall be prepared and p~ocessed in accordacce ~ith the
Spac~ Shuttle Program Level II C~nfi9uration hanaqeBent
Require5ents document, JSC 01700. Volume IV.
1.2 DR1IArrOM PROCEDURE. Devihtior.s and ~aivers to tbe
regDire.e~ts of this document sbali ~e submitted for. approval in
accordance with the Space Snu~tle Proq~am L~Yel II Configuration
Managellent ne':Ju,lreilents docul:lent, JSC 01700, VolulIa IV.
1-2 CHANGE NO. 2
~'
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES
FOR
LIGHTNING CRITERIA DOCUMENT CHANGE COORDINATION
Donald D. Arabian
Dwight L. Suite~
William R. Durrett
Clyde ~hittaker
Buford E. Gallahe~
Ross W. Evans
Lt. Col. Charles T. Essmeie~
Lt. Col. James A. Feibelman
Neville Radcliffe
B: L. Giffin
Figure 1-1 Authorized Representatives For Document Change
Coordination
1-3
HASA-JSCJ SC Form 14.5 (May 13)
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PROTECT I ON CRITERI~ ODCUMENT
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Johnson Sene!! C(!nter
Kennedy Space Center
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Nnrshall Space Fl i&ht Cen ler
Space and Missile Syst~nl5 Or~nn i Z1J.t i on -XRZ (USAF)
Rockwell International
. AF PROVAL
"
Figure 1-2 Sample amendment form.
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2.C LIGHTNING ENiIROH8EMT. The Bodel lightning flash shown in
Fi.gure A-, and detailed in Appendix 1 shall be used for
ap~lytical and test purpos~s to tne degree practicDl.
This Bodel involves two strokes: the first bas a cu~r8nt peak of
200,000 amperes and a current rat.e of change ,,')t '100,000 amperes
per microsecond (100 kA/10- 6 sec) i the second stro~e is on8-
fourth the aagnituoe of t~e first. The Bodol incarporates
intermediate currents persisting ~or a few ailliseconds and a
continuing current. The second stroke is Dot ~l~ays present in a
lightning flash; ho~ever, if the second stroke ~xists, it is
lIodeled to occur froll 17 to 230 .illis3conds fc,lloving the first
ret~rn stroke. This Model of the second stro~e shall be "ned for
SWQpt strQk0 arc re&ttachaent analysis. The ~otal charge
transf~~~ed in the t~o stroke medal is 200 coulombs with 16.1
coulolllbs contained i,n the second stroke. T~/CI hundr~d cQulolQbs is
contained in the first stroke when ~ second ~troke is not present
in the flash.
Only ra=ely can l~boratory tests duplicate the se_exity of the
Dodel flasn. Siaulation of the effects of the sev~re flash ~re
~ost practically a~d~ using seyeral different test vavefo~Qs,
each tailored to duplicate Dne of tbe effects of the entire
seve~e lightning flash. Section 1 and Appendix E des~ribe the
desirable characteristi~z o~ test va~efor.s to be used.
(j) 2.1 LIGHTNING Enai/EIIT l'On1TS (tAU NCO .UW DE3CE&1T PHASES).
The most likely lightning entry/exit points for the launch phase
anli the descent phase al:e sh,w[\ in FilJures 2-1 and 2-2
respect.ively.
(j)rtefet: t.o the Devi...tion!\Iaiver P~ge in fcor.t of til,.', docuaent..
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3.0 PLIGHT RARDUARB.
3.1 DIRECT BFFeCTS. Direct effects of ligbtning are the burning,
blasting, direct coupling of 901tag9s and currents, and
structur~l defor.~tion ~a~sad by lightning ~rc attach~ent, as
veIl as the big~ pres~ur~ shockvavas &nd ~agnetic forcas produced
by the qss~ciatad higb currents.
3.1.1 J;a£t.d~A1..!a~Uli. Electrical (cables should not, "here .
ponsilile, ba e:itposait tCl Uie direct effl!:icts of ligbtlllin'1. Exposed
ca~les shall be c~~er~d with electrically continuous metallic
enclosures.
3.,1.2 1~ic12_~IY£!j~§i_!Bt~£2i-40;E;t§hL~~~~9a1-1A~
~al!9-Rq£~_n2g§~t. Each interface shall be able to uithstand
the _cdel lightning f.lash without jeopardizing the strength or
&nJ functions requirred to safely continue the mission.
S~ruct~ral interface surfaces shall be designed to hav~ less than
2.5 milliobas resis~ance across their ea~ed surfaces. rhe
inte~face shall also retain the specified resistaLce for the
us~ful life of the vehicle.
3.1.3 ~nding. 1n electrical path sball be provided be~v~en
structures or co.ponent~ that are in the main li9btDi~g current
path and ~ball baye a resistance of 2.5 ailliohms or less. Only
those doo~sw pane19. and cont~ol 5urfacas in the aain ligbtning
path requir6 bonding. However, bondi~g of external doors,
panels, aDd control surfaces not in the main li9htni~g path shall
baye a resi~~ance of not Dore tkan 10 milliob_s ~nless
electronagnetic interferance cousiG~cations dictate a love~
resistance. Electrical cables and connectors are excluded fro.
the reCll!ireaents of this paLr4gr&ph.
3.1. 4 ~UY£1~. For grollnd operatiolds. a prefarred continuous
metallic pa~b s~~ll be provided f~o~ t~e preferred poin~ of
lightning entry into the composite Space Shuttle vehicle to tne
preferred e~it point. The metal shall be capabl~ of conducting
th= ?a~t aDd continuous current of the aodel li9~tDing flash
without jeopardizin~ crew safetJ or del~yin9 a launch.
~)3.i.~.1 Vehicle extre8ities, both E9tallic and DOD-.~t&llic~
~hall withst~Dd ~~e full model lightning flash without sustaining
cia.age t.h&t "ould caURe a aalfuDctiofl that would ~esu'.t in t.he
108s of the vehicle. lon-Betallic surfaces s.ball either be
~Qpplied with axterior cQrrent-conducting paths, or shall
de.~nstrat~ ~he intrinsic capability to with8taD~ tbe lightning
f.lash. T~Qse areas of the vehicle for ¥hich the atate-of-the-Br~
3-1 CHANGE NO. "
cannot pro~ide protection shall be tested to deter~ine the
operational constrai~ts.
3.~.5 D~!~i9g_A§~B21!~. Each bearing asseBbly in the ~ain
lightninq current path shall be able to withstand tQ9 model
lightning flash witbout damage. figur.e 3-1 shows the hinged
bearing surfaces. Continuous metal hinges (piano-type) are self
bonding, p~oviaaa that the resistance across the binge is less
than 10 Dillioh~s.
3.1.6 ln~nni§. Antennas should not be located in tbe ?ri~e
lightning arc attac~mGnt ~reas. See Fiqures 2-1, and 2-2. All
antennas sb&ll be protected against lightning effects.
3.1. -, nMUJ!!~fi!ll~§.&-QUg~D.e._:1llLtl,~Il.r.!ll!~!M.11! •.~H.
Tamlts g lin,:2:;, a~d ~f,450cil\ted b!CC38S doors, drains. (lIld vents
sh&ll b~ designed such tbat s~&r~in9 froD lightning and static
electricity canno~ occur insida t~e v0bicle struc~ure.
LiDes, tan~s# drains, and yents enposed to direct li~htning arc
attacbments shall be oesigned such that the ignition point of
either the container eaterials or the fluids shall not be
reached. Bafer to Appendix B for guideline data.
3.1.6 !~~-fb~~~' Air data prcbes shall be designed to
preVent tbe lightning current froll directly couplil\9 into the
Yehicle electrical powe~ system and/or &acagioq the vehicle
structure.
3.2 INDIRECT EFFECTS. Indire~t effects of lightning are damage
or aalfunctions due to cu~re~ts and voltages caused by the
electroDagnetic fields ~&sociated with lightning.
El~ctrical equip.ant shall be designed to vith~tand the elec-
'troallqnetic eff~cts produced by lightnin9 without daaage or
malfunction ~bat endangers the creu, the 'success of the aissioft,
or delays a launc~.
The electri.cal equipllent sho~ld be designed to wi tbstand etectro-
liiagnetic effects produced by lightning lIit.hout any .alfunction or
upset, eveD if sucn aalfuQction does not enda~ger the crew or the
SQccess of the Dissioa.
COlpli3nce to this require~ent sh~ll include the interactions
between the different ter~inal equipment or between tar.inal
e~uipueDt and intercO~De~tinq cablesa and shall be deaoDBtratod
in each case by analysis or test.
Transient design le~els shall be establish0d in accor~aDce with
&ppendiZ 1).
)-2 CHANGE ~tO. 2
m3. 2.1 ~h.i.~l.9.ll.g. Overall std.elds shliH .\:)e pt"o"ided for all
cables to eo&t~ol t~~ transients unless:
a. P~ot$ction is provided bi neaft5 o~ber than shlelds: O~
b. Such transients do Dot affect ere. safety, Dission
SQccess, or timo of launch.
O'l'eratll cable shi~lds sb~ll be c;ont.iuuolls without. br~ :ks or
splices il except. et: CORn-:Jctors aDd i1it braDc~ point.s on cables with
Bultipla b~eatoutso The overall sbield, a~ a Binimun, shall be
grollltded to t!uUlteOiq getallic structure or I!qnipllollt ground at.
$acb €Ina. Inter~edia tE; grollncUn~ Day be blt:"ld.
3.2.1.1 Shields on conductors, where req~ir~4v sm~ll bave a
miniBUS coYeraq~ of 6S percent. S~ielaed c~nd~ctors inside the
owerall cable s~ields 8ay be grounded as &p~ropriat.Q for control
af la,v-leYel or lov-frequellcy electroflagneti.c interference.
3.2.1.2 On external skins, termination of the overall shield
sball be .ade along a 360-deqres periphery of the connector
shell A Tbe CODn'ector sbell sh~ll be grounded in 4 160-tlagree
aanner to the surface upon vbic~ it is aOQntea. Ter.lnat.ion aGd
grouD~in9 of the overall sbleld at such surfacas with pigtails or
siDgle pins shall not be ~cceptable.
3.2.1.3 Ter~1~atioD of the overall shield at co~nectors 00
internal bu!kbead~ should be aade alonq a 360-degree periphery of
the connector shell. If terginatlon and grounding i~ Dade with &
pigtail or through a connector pin, the connect.ion shall be Bade
directly to the bul1tneaa llsinc; tlle .inieoB lengtb patb. ~he
resistance of the pigtail sball not exceed 2.S .i11ioh.s.
3.2.2 f~~~qI~. Current-c.onductinq .patbs sh~ll be prowided
betve4l!ll' webie!. interfaces only through tbo elect.rical illLterfllce.
structure at iDt~r.ehicular interfaces sball not be relied upon
as current-conducting pover-r~tnra patbs.
3.2.2.1 Intral'ehicular pover l':.istriblltio!ll syst.eas ShOllJ.d incor-
porate a single-point grounding system to preyent ground loops.
].2.2~2 ploating pover distribution srst~.s are accept.able.
3.2.2.3 In~r.vabicular str~ctnral retur~s 4~O acceptable
provid~d thAt. sQCb paths do not &110w co~pling that voald cause
adtfer:s't effeets l to the operation of ~ny slstes in t.h6 "ehicte.
3.2.:2, 4 El~ctroaagnetic coupling can be controlled by shielding,
rOlIt.in~ of conductors, or by the IU1I9 of U.ansient DllppresB10h
devices. '11 t~ansieft~ suppression device failure Bodes should
.See App~ndix G for definition of adverse effects.
Q> Refer t.o the Devi.at:lon/eaiver Page in front of the dOCIl,8ent.
3-3 CHANGE NO.2
be fail-open ~nder norzal vehicle system operating condi~ions and
after a lightning strike. (See Appendig C for sQppression
devices and ~heir capabilitiese;
3.2.3 !§h!£1~!iIing_ln1~1l~li-jQ'Qi~~~&~~l-~!~Solid
Rg~k9t-IQoste£l. Uirinq inte~f&ces shall be controlled to
prevent 'I'lolt&qe:.s or curreats, resulting froll the direct o~
indirect effects of lightning, from dama~inq or interfering with
terminal e~uipDent..
3.2.4 n~ndv14jl~~~2n§. Equipment frequency bandwidths
sbould ~9 established that are no wider than necessary for proper
operatioh.
3.2.3 A!igQissJi~~. Lightniog effects shall not cause a
10~s of po~er of such a duration that would result in adverse
ef.f~cts to category 1 equip.ent.
3-4 CHANGE NO.2
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4.0 GROUND HARrWARE. Ground hardware, for the purpose of this
document, includes equipment and facilities directly or
indir~ctly connected to the vehicle" the proper function of which
is essential to personnel and equipment safety, mission succe~s,
and to prevent launch delay.
4.1 DiRECT EFFECTS. Equipment and facilities which cannot
withstand dirEct lightning effects, as defined in paragraph 3.1,
shall be protected by air terminals and/or conductors. Equipment
and facilities may be protected by the cone of protection of
oth~r structures.
L~.1.1 19hi£lg=1Q=fg£iliiY-Qro~n£in~. Facility grounding
provisions shall be designed to provide a resistance of 2.5
milliohms or less between the external tank and the mobile
launcher, between th~ Orbiter and the mobile launcher~ and
between each of the solid rocket motors and t.he mobile launcher.
lJ.l.2 It!:,g£!.I.1£s!..-QQ,!!,Q,.!ng. The electrical conductive r;ath or
bond between structures or components in the main lightning
current path shall have a resistance of 2.5 milliohms or less.
4.1.3 f~bl~LI£,g:l~' All cable trays shall be protected from a
rlirect lightning flash. All vertical cable trays on facility
structures exposed to the electromagnetic effects of lightnipg
shall be of solid metal and completely covered, and when
practical, be mounted internal to th8 facility structure.
4.2 INDIRECT EFFECTS. Indirect effects are damage or
malfunctions due to cur~ents and voltages caused by the
electromagnetic fields associated with lightning.
4.2.1.1 GroU!;c:!ing systems, such as E (Equipment) and I
(Instrumentation) ground systems, s~all be connected together at
only a single point, and this sinyle point shall be connected tc
earth.
4.2.1.2 Circuits and signal ground shall be referenced to a
grounding system isolated from structure except at one point.
4.2.2 1.1ghtn!ng_~~Q!ection-2h!~ldi~go
4.2.2.1 All cables shall have an overall shield for lightning
protection. The ov~rall shield, as a minimum, shall be grounded
to bulkhead metallic structure or equipment grounding terminals
at least at each end. Overall shielfls shall be continuous
without breaks or splices except at connectors and at tranch
points on cables with multiple breakouts. Intermediate grounding
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should b~ used where the overall shield penetrates or touches
metal. Cables located completely within shielded compartments
need not comply.
4.2.2.2 Shields on conductors shall have a minimum coverage of
85 percent. Shielded conductors inside the overall cable shields
may be grounded as appropriate for control of low-level or low-
frequency electromagnetic interference.
4.2.2.3 Termination of the overall shield on external bulkheads
shall be made along a 360-degree per~phery of the connector
shell. The connector shell shall be yrounded in a 360-degree
manner to the bulkhead upon which it is mounted. Termination and
grounding of the overall shield at such bulkheads with pigtails
or single pins shall not be acceptable.
4.2.2.4 Termination of the ove~all shield at connectors on
internal bulkheads should be made along a 360-degree periphery of
the connector shell. If termination and grounding is made with a
pigtail or throuqh a connector pin, the connection shall be made
directly to the bulkhead metallic structure using the minimum
length path. The resistance of the pigtail shall not exceed 2.5
milliohms.
4.2.3 Band~!gi~_1imii~liQQ§. Equipment frequency bandwidths
shuuld be established that are no wider than necessar.y for proper
oferations.
4.3 VEHrCLE/FACILITY INTERFACES (LOOKING TOWARDS THE FACILITY).
4.3.1 Metallic Tubes and Ducts. All metallic tubes and ducts
penetrating-the-V~Icle-skinshall be electrically bonded to the
vehicle skin. If this bonding is accomplished with a jumFer,
this jumper shall b~ as short as possible.
4.3.2 !£~si~n1-g~otecliQg_Qg!i~~~. Transient protection
devices shall be installed on po~er lines at the closest
practical point to where the power lines penetrate the vehicle
skin. These transient protection devices shall be installed both
line-to-line and line-to-ground. Such transient protectian
devices may be eliminated, if it is shown by analysis and test
that the margin between the actual-induced transien~ leve15 and
the susceptibility of the terminal apparatus meets t~e guidelines
of Appendix D.
4.3.3 . Vehicle-to-Ground Hardware Interfaces. Wiring intl!rfaces
shall be-controlled~o pre~'~t-Voltages-or-cur~entsresulting
fram the direct or indirect effects of lightning from damaging or
interfering with terminal equipment. At the vertical flight
facility, ground hard~ar2 electrical lines should interface the
vehicle as clese to the base as practical to minimize the
indirect effects of lightning.
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5.0 PYROTECHNICS.
5.1 PROTECTION OF MATERIALS AND DEVICES. Installation of
pyrot~chnic materials dnd devices shall be designed to provide a
specific current path around the pyrotechnic materials and
devices such that the effects of the full model lightning current
will not cause dudding or inadvertent firings.
5.2 PROTECTION OF ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS Pyrotechnic electrical
firing curcuits, po~er sources, and controlling logic shall be
designed such that no functional failures will result from the
direct and indirect effects of the full mooel lightning current.
5.2.1 ~Qnding. The initiator and controlling logic containers
sb~ll be electrically bonded to the vehicle structure. The
measured elect~ical bond resistance from the components to their
respective adjacent vehicle structure shall be less than 2.5
milliohms.
5.2.2 Shi~lQing. Shielded twisted-pair ~ires shall be used for
each single bridg~wire explosive device initiator. Shields shall
be continuous without breaks or splices, with the exception of
thr.0ugh-pins in pressure bulkhead electrical connectors.
Shielding termination at connectors shall provide 360-degree
coverage. The shield design shall Frovide a minimum area
coverage of 85 percent for attenuatiun.
5.3 TESTING. The requirements of paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 shall
be verifiea by tests.
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6.0 FERRYING REQUIREMENTS. All electrical and mechanical
interfaces between the o~biter and the carrier aircraft shall
meet the requir.ements of this document.
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7.0 VERIFICATION. ~ severe lightning current waveform model has
been defined for the Space Shuttle as a design requirement and
incluQed in Appendix A of this document. The reproduction of
this complete waveform would be expensive and difficult;
therefore, some si~plified test waveforms are prescribed for
demonstrating compliance with the severe model reguire~ents.
7.1 WAVEFORMS. The transient currents and voltages produced by
simulation devices may be described by certain idealized
waveforms. These same waveforms may be used as approxi~ations to
the actual lightning current and to the currents and voltages
produced by the lightning current.
The four most commonly encountered waveforms are shown on Figure
7-1. The physically realizable waveiorms (solid lines) an~
straig~t line approximations (dotted lines) are both shown.
These waveforms describe both the amplitude and time history of
the waveform. The most important factors that must bE defined
for each of the waveforms are:
a. Arnrlitude - l\
b. Time to crest - t (straight line approximation - t'l)
1
c. periol'! of oscillation - T [in ter-IDS of f.ceguency, (f)
T -= 1/fJ
d. Decrement or :Latio of amplitudes of successive half
cycles.
a. Amflitude - A
b. Time to crest - t (straight line approximation - t~).
1
c. Time to half value t
2
a. Amrlitude - A (time to crest and time to half value
same as the exponential wave)~
b. AmFlitude of the backswing - A2
7·· 1
c. Duration of the backs~ing - t
4
minus t
J
a. Amplitude - ~
~. Time to crest - t
1
c. Time to half value - t
2
d. Duration - t
3
7.2 APPLICABILITY OF WAVEFORMS
7.2.1 ~1~~£1_~!tg£i~. The solid lines of the damped oscillatory
waveform and exponential waveform (Figure 7-1) should be used for
exterior hardware and total vehicle tests. The solid lines in
Figure 7-1 indicate the general test waveforms which are defined
in more deta~l in Appendix E. These waveforms are determined by
the type of equipment available for artificial lightning
genecators, specifically capacitor banks firing into the test
circuits, which results in dil.mped oscillatory and exponential
waveforms.
7.2. 2 lndi£~£.tJ.ffe(;~Alli!l;[§.!§.. ~nalysis of indirect effects
is most easily accomplished vith a straight line approximation of
the natural and artificial lightning current waveforms. These
are illustrated by the dashed lines in Figure 7-1, and are
defined in ~ore detail in ~ppendix E.
7.2.3 Indirect Effects Test. ~est waveforms for indirect tests
are determined-boti-by t~pulse sources and the coupling devices
with resultant waveforms shown in b, c, and d paction of Figure
7-1, and in more detail in Appendix E.
7.3 FLIGHT HARUW!RE (ORBITER/SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS/EXTERNAL
TANK/MAIN ENGINES).
7.3.1.1 A series of tests shall be made on those components of
the structure most likely to be subjected to the direct burning,
blasting, or mechanical effects of lightning. The purpose of
these tests shall be to determine ~hether those components will
suffe~ uuacceptable physical damage. Exterior hard~are having a
criticality of 1 shall be tested. Exterior hardware having a
criticality of 2 ~nd 3 should be tested, if ~nalysis so
indica tes.
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1.3.1.2 The items to be tested should include, hut. ~i.ll not be
limited to the following:
a. Navigation lights
b. Separation latching mechanisms
c. Guillotine devices
d. Fuel fille~ caps
c. ~ccess doors
f. Umbilical systems
g. Umbilical covers
h. Antennas
i~ Air Data Prohes
j"- Fuel gents
k. Exte~nal structural skin joints
:.3.1.3 A mora detailed discussion of the test waveforms to b~
used fo~ direct effects testing is given in Appendix E.
7.3.2 ComEone.~~~a S~2I§!~_Level !ests - Ind!~£i-Eff~~
7.3.2.1 1 serj~s of analysis and transient proof tests shall be
conducted on a sUbsyst~~ level.
7.3.2.2 The actual transient level to which lightning is
expected to i~press upon the equip~ent shall be calculated.
Appendix F may be used as a guide to such calculations. On the
ground, ~here the vehicle can b~ the entry point for lightning,
ac~ual tr.ansient levels imprp.ssed upon any associa~ed scound
hard.a~e shall also be included in ~he calculations.
7.3.2.3 Each piece of electrical equipment shall be assigned a
transient design level at Which a transient proof test say be
made to verify that tne appara~us will not suffer adverse
effects. The type of test (voltage or current), the type of
application (common mode or line-to-line), the amplitude, and the
frequancy or wave-snape parameters shall be included in the
comple~t ~p~cificatio~ of the transient test l~vels.
7.3.2.4 Transient proof tests are discussed in Appendix D~ ~
series of transient levels shall be developed that are
appropriate to the different typ~s of apparatus and the
~lectroma9netic environment to which that apparatus i.s e.posee.
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Appendix D may be used as ~he initial guidelines for the
developaen~ of srch levels~
7.3.2.5 The actual transient level produced by lightning ~b.all
be verified to be les.s than the transient test level to ifhich the
eqmipment bas been subjected or the ~ransient design level, if
the proof test has been ~aived.
7.3.2.6 The required margin bet~een the actual transient level
and the transient test or design level shall be deteEmined from
the guidelines given in Appendix D.
7.3.2.1 Transient proof tests shall be performed on ~ll
criticality 1 electrical equipment. Transient proof tests shoeld
be performed on criti~ality 2 and 3 electrical eguip~eDt, if
analysis so indicates. An alternate te1,;t and analysis lIay be
conducted for large corrent high inductive devices, such as
relays, solenoids, and ~otOES, consisting of a 1250 volt - 60
Bertz dielectric withstanding voltage test and an analysis of the
induced differential current.
7.4 TOT~L VEHICLE TESTS. Simulated lightning tests shall be
cODduct~d on the O~biter vehicle. Tho test vehicle sho~ld ~e
outfitted wit.h as co.plete a set of a'donics equip.'~nt exS
possible and be configured for operations at altitudes ~elo~
50,000 feet. Tile avionics equipllent shall be opel:'ated dur.ing a
represen~ative fortiou of these test~ to verify coapliance with
the require~ents of this document. rhe generalized test
waveforRS to be used in the lightninq siRulation testing are
shown in Figure 7-1 and describ,ed in more detail in Appendix En
Waveforas more closell approximating those of Appanaix A should
be used, if available.
7~5 GROUND H!RDilBE
1.5.1.1 1Tehic;le-to-Paci1itl Grounding. Verificati,on of the 2.5-
milliohm requirement of paragraph 4.1.1 shall he ~ade by analysis
and, if practical, shall be verified periodically bl actual
measurellent.
7.5.2.1 EquipDent and Inst~umentationGrounds - Ve~ification of
the reguirellents of paragraph 4.2.1.1' shall be acco~\plished by
measurE.ent during initial facility construction and pe~iodically
thereafter.
7.5.2.2 continuity of' Cable Shields - The continuity of the
overall cable shields, specified in paragraph Q.2.2.1, shall be
verified prior to cab1e installlatilJn. Verification '\that overall
shielding integrity is maintained after cahle install&tion shall
be performed r where practical.
7.5.2.3 Calculation of Actual Transient Levels - Circuits of
criticality l~vel 1 and 2 shall be analyzed in accordance uith
hppendix D to determine the transient levels produced upon those
circujts by lightning. This analysis shall be made in sufficient
&etail to determine both the differential-mode and the commou-
mode transients upon both the 9~ound hardware and associated
flight hardware.
7.5.2.4 Transient Design Levels - Transient design levels shall
be established for all ground hardware of cr.iticality levels 1
and 2. These levels should be determined by analysis of design
data using the guidelines in Appendix D. The transient design
levels shall include Doth common-uode and differential-mode
interference. Transient design levels should be established for
equipment of criticality le?el 3 r if "analysis so indicates.
1.5.2.5 Tra~sient Proof Tests - On ground hardvare of
criticality levels 1 and 2. transient proof tests or transient
analyses shall beperforaed ~o demonstrate that th~ actual
t~ansient levels are lover than the assigned transient design
levels by the margins given in appendix D.
7.5.2.6 Transient Level Verification - Provisions shall be &ade
to measure the indi~ect effects of actual ligh~ning on
rep~esentative ci~cuits when ground hardware is connected to the
vehicle during rollout and on the launch pad. These aeasurements
are to be used for evaluating the equipment actual transient
levels previously calculated in accordance with paragraph
7.5.2.3.
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cJ Exponential wave with backswing
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t 1 t 2 t,3
d) Generalized triangular wave
Figure 7-1 Description of waveforms.
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8.0 WE~THER RESTRICTIONS.
8.1 DEVELOPMENT FLIGHTS. ~eather restrictions will be imposed
for development flights which will preclude vehicle involvement
with lightning during lauQch, therefore, development flight
instrumentation is exempt from the requirements of this docnment
with the follcwing exception: For the Orbiter entry phase, t~e
DFI design and installation s~all preclude the introduction of
lightning effects into electrical/elect~onic equipment tihich
could cause damage or malfunction that would endanger the crew o~
the success of the mission.
8.2 OPERATIONAL FLIGHTS, To be determined after lightning
protection d~si~ns have been verified.
8.3 FERRY FLIGHTS. Weather restrictions will be impose~for
ferry flights uhich should preclude vehicle involvement with
lightning.
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APPENDIX A
LiGHTNING MODELS
APPENDIX A
LIGHTNING MODELS
The currents flowing in a 1ightning flash to ground are
conveniently separated into three categories:
a. Return stroke surges
b. Intermediate currents
c. continuing currents
Peak current on the order of
up to 100,000 A or ~ore.
Duration on the order of tens
of microseconds.
Peak current on the order of
up to 10,000 A or more.
Duration ~n the order of milli-
seconds.
Peak current on the order of
up to 1000 A.
Duration an the order of hun-
dreds of milliseconds.
Currents of types (~ and (c) are principally responsible for
damage such as hole-burning while type (a) currents Mainly
pro~ucp explosive effects and undesirable coupling transients.
In general, the time structure of lightning currents is less
variable bet~een individual flasnes than are the amplitudes. It
fellows that severe lightning medels are best developed first in
terms of amplitUdes, with subsequent secondary adjustments to the
time st~ucture, in order to obtain overall physical reality.
Furtnermore, there is little connection within an individual dis-
charge between the severity of the three categories of currenti
in other words, even if an initial return-stroke surge is severe,
this has minimal influence on the severity of a followiu~ con-
tinuing current.
~he current-time history for a model lightning flash to ground is
ShOWR diagrammatically in Figure 1-1 with ~ome furtber details
b~in9 presented in Table A.1. The flash is a very se~ere
discharge. The model is formulated in terms of certain key
points (A tbrough K in Figure A-1) at which specific values of
current, i, and time, t. are attained. Between successive key
points, the current is assumed to change in a steady straight
line fashion with time••
• This simple representation leads to discontinuities in the rate
of change of current (di/dt). However, when necessary - as in
some computing ~ork - these discontinuities are easily accommo-
dated by various mathematical devices.
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The model consists of seven cu~rent stages: a first ~eturn
stroke includi~g both a main-current surgE~ and an intermediate
current; a conti~uing current in two phases; and a second
subsequent stroke again comprising a main surge succeeded by
intermediate currents and continuing currents. The continuing
current is modeled in two phases because material damage Froduced
by continuing currents depends Oil actual time and current values
(Appendix B), and is not - as if often incorrectly believed - a
function of charge transfer alone~ It is possible that special
types of damage cc~ld be produced by a subsequent stroke
following a continuing current y for example i.n swept stroke arc
reattachments; hence the addition of the second stroke.
The model represents a ~g~~ severe flash. For instance, the
first stroke involves a peak current of 200 kA and a rate of
current rise of 100 kA/~s; thes~ values are exceeded.
respectively, in some 0.7 percent and 2 percent of the first
strokes.
Also. the charge transfer represented by the continuing currents
is 110 coulombs with an average current of 700 A in the initial
phase; these magnitudes a~e surpassed, respectivell~ in 0.5
percent and 1 percent of continuing currents. Ayain~ a peak
curLeilt of 50 kA is only exceeded in 5 percent of SUbsequent
strokes. A further im~crtant point is that the values of many
lightning parameters are not interconnected. Thus, in our model
flash, ~~ have a first stroke peak current of 200 kA, a total
charge transfer of 200 coulombs, and a SUbsequent stroke peak
currpnt of 50 kA; since these three pa~ameters are ~ssenrially
unrelated. it follo~s that the three ~pecified va]aes aLe s!l
exceeded in the same discharge for less than one in one-hundred
thousand flashes to qround.
The model is esentially developed for applied purposes and it has
conseguently been simplified appr.opriately in both the analytical
and physical respects. In physical reality, a severe discharge
wonld have far more strokes an~ also, more phases of continuing
current than indicated on Figure A-1; ho~ever, the integrated
effects of a very severe natural discharge and of the model ar9
similar.
Intracloud discharges are less severe than flashes to ground
largely because of the absence of the large sudden return-stoke
surges. Thus, if material and equipment are unaffected by the
severe ground-dischar~e model, material and equipment will also
be im~une to intracloud flashe~.
Further informatio~ on the concepts advanced in this Appendix is
summarized in tva sourcos:
a. Lighlnj.iJ.:l (McGraw-Hill) by M. A. Uman (1969).
A--3
b. "A Ground-Lightning Environment for Engineering Usage R
by N. Cianos and E. T. Pierce, Stanford Research Insti-
tute report (1972).
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Table A.l Details of Lightning Model
19.6C
0.2C
~10. 2C
-, itA
1 I:.A
i
i
100 /LS
S ms
t
t
2. First stroke
intermediate
current
r-------------------~-----------------··---------------------------------------------------,
I I I I Charge
, Stage I Key Points: I Rate of cur:rent change I passing
-----------------1------------------------------1--------------------------------1---------
I I
1. First return ItO i 0 I Linear rise - 100 kA/~S
stroke surge I t 2 ~s i 200 kA I Linear fall 193 kA in 98 /.IS
t 100 ~s i i kA 1
I
I Linear falL - 6 kA in Q.9 IDS
I
J. Con'tinuing
curr~'nt -
fir."st phase
t
t.
5 ms
55 ms
i
i
1 ItA
400 A
Linear fall - 600 h in 50 ms 35.0C
\/.75C
- 2.28C
- O. 05C
135.0c
~ 25 kA/!'s
Linear fall - 3.1 kA in 5 ms
Linear fall - 46.5 kA in 98 ~s
Linear rise
Steady cUJ:"r'!nt
o
].5 kA
].5 kA
QOOA
400 A
400 A
i.
i
i
i
i
i
5 IllS
165 IDS
100 /J.S
2 /J.S
55 ms
392 ms
~ 17 ms - 230 ms to t
s
50 kA
t
t
4. continuing
current -
secC"nd phase ,
I
5. Second return,
stroke surge I
, t.
I s
I t
I s
I
6. Second stroke I t
intermediate I s
current I t
, s
I I I I Il •· •· ------~- . ~
'late: t. Time associated ~it.h first return stroke
t = ~tme associated with s~cond return stro~e
s
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HEATING AND PUNCTURE OF METALLIC SUHFACES BY LIGHTNING
APPENDIX B
HEATING AND PONCTURE OF METALLIC SURFACES BY LIGHTNING
At and near the point (circular spot on the order of 0.5 inch or
less in diamete~) that lightning enters or leaves a metallic
surfac~, energy is transferred to that metal. The result is
heated metal and possible puncture (burn or melt-through) of the
metal. In general, the thicker the metal and the higher its
electrical and tbermal conductivities, the less severe the
damage. Most heating effects are due to lightning currents in
the one-hundred to several-tho~~and ampere range with durations
of hundreds of milliseconds to G few milliseconds. (The
intermediate and continuing current phases of the lightning
model.)
~na11tical approaches to this heat transfer problem are
complicated by the lack of knowledge on the fraction of the
energy input delivered to evaporation and sputtering, which may
be large, and the lack of knowledge on the thermal and electrical
properties of metals of high temperatures. The best available
informat1on ou lightning-metal interactions has been obtained by
laboratory simulation. The results of these studies are probably
indicative of more damage than would be produced by actual
lightning, since the laboratory-arc contact spot is generally not
as free to move on the surface as is the actual lightning.
Experimental data due to Brick are sho~n in Figures B-1 and B-2.
Figure B-1 indicates the charge transfer, the time for that
transfer, and the steady current needed for that charge transfer
in order to produce a burn-through of aluminum sheets (back
surface to 660°C) of various thicknesses. Figure B-2 gives
charge~ time, and current to raise the back surface of titaniu~
to 1320 0 C (jet-fuel ignition temperature). The melting point of
titanium is about 1100oc.
Experience with com~ercial aircraft and laboratory studies have
shown that windstream and electromagnetic effect operate to move
the point-of-arc attachMent. This motion is greater for some
materials than for others depending largely on surface
properties. Electrode configurations may tend to render the arc
stationary. Usually, however, the windstream movement effects
are dominant - except on trailing edges - so that "sticking"
times on conducting material Dor~ally used on air~raft are of the
order of a millisecond. For bare skins, the inteLmediate current
phases are the most critical in that they cause damage vith
minimum cha~ge transfer. Even yith sweeping effects, the
intermediate current can puncture thin skins at low air
velocities.
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Further information can be obtained from the tollowing sources:
a. R o. Brick, "A Method for Establishing Lightning
Resistance/Skin Thic~ness Requirerneuts for Aircraft",
USAF Avionics Labo~atories, wright-Patterson AFB v Ohio,
Proceedings, 1968 Lightning and Static Electricity
Conference, D~cember, 1968~Miami, Florida.
b. R 0 Brick r L L. Ob, S. D. Schneider, "The Effects of
Lightning httachment Phenomena on Aircraft Design",
USAF, Proceedings, 1970 Lightning and Static Electricity
ccnference. December, 1970, San Diego, California.
c. R H Evans and J. Phillpott, "Lightning Simul~tion and
Testing in Relation to Specification MIL-B-50S7",
Proceedings, 1972 Lightning and Static Electricity
Conference, December 12, 1972 r Las Vegas, Nevada.
d. M. M. Ne~man, J. R. Stahmann~ J. D. Robb, and T. Ghen,
"Lightning Discharge S~e~ping Effects on Current Pitting
of Aircraft Skins", 1&T Report No. 530, April, 1971;
Lightning t Transients Research Institute, st. Paul_
Minnesota.
e. M. J. Kofoid, "Lightning Discharge Heating of Titanium
Aircraft Skins~, Boeing Scientific Research
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~PPENDIX C
TRANSIENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES
APPENDIX C
TRARSIENT PROTECTIVE DE~lCES
Transient. protective devices offer the rossibility of 1~proving
the ability of a system to withstand the electromagnetic ~ffects
of lightning.
There are two basic types of overvoltage or transient protection
~evices, those which on sensing an overvoltage SYitch to ~ low
impedance state and thus cause the impressed voltage ~cross them
to collapse to a low value, and those uhich on ~ensing an
overvoltage tend, by virtue of their non-linear voltage-current
~elation, to maintain the voltage at that level, but do not
collapse the !oltage. ~xamples of the first type are spark gaps
and arcing dielectrics. ]xamples of the second type are Zener
diodes and varistors. Ihere are also devices, which on sensing
an overvoltage, interrupt the Eover flo~ to the loaj. If this
interruption is accomplished by electromechanical means, they
2hould not be considered ~ransient protD~tion devices because
they are inherently slo~ to responde
§witching devices inherently offer greater surge power handling
£apability thaD do the Zener or varistor types of devices. !h~
instantaneous pover dissipated in a transient prot€ctive device
is the Eroduct of the surge current flowing through the device
and the voltage ~cross the device. lor a constant sur9~ current~
a switching device, like a spark gap across ~bich the voltage is
low while in the conducting state, will have less powe~ released
in it than a device like a Zener diode across which !he surge
voltage remains high. lor a given surge power handling
capability, a spark gap will thus be ~~aller physically than ~
Zener diode or varistor device~
Another fundamental difference between switching devices (spark
gaps) ~nd non-SWitching devices (Zener diodes or varistors)
related to ~hei~ £ecovery characteristics after the surge haS
passed. If a line is protected by a spark gap and if that line
is connected to a §ou~ce Qf energy (a power bus, for example) ,
that energy source must be ~isconnected from the line before the
spark gap can switch back from its low impedance conducting state
to its high impedance non-conducting 2tate. gemer~lly~ this
reqUires opening a circuit breaker on the line. ! Zener diode or
varistor effectively ceases to conduct as soon as the voltage
£eturns to its normal value. Qperation of remote circuit
breakers is not required. !ransient protective devices are not a
panacea. ~owevBr, all types of over-voltage protection device~
inherently operate ~y reflecting a portion of the surge ~nergJ to
its source and ~y diverting 1he rest into another path, all with
C-2
the intention of dissipating the surge ~nergy in trie resistance
of the ground and in tbe interconnecting loads. 1be alternative
to reflecting the energy is to absorb the surge ~nergy in an
unprotected load. !eflection and diversion of the surge energy
are not without their hazards.
~. The refl€cted energy can possibly appear on othec unpro-
tected circuits.
~. Multiple reflection may cause the transient to last
longer than it vould othe~wise.
s. The spectral density of the energy may be changed, with
~itber high or low f[equencies being enhanced.
Interference problems on other circuits may well be
enhanced even though the £isk of damage to the protected
circuit is reduced.
~ost commonly, the type of transient protective device to be used
£epends au the amount of surge energy to be reflected.
Qenerally, this energy decreases the further away one gets from
~he ~tLoke. lhe surge en€rgy to be expected can also be related
crudely to the normal Qperating power of the circuit invol~ea.
gne ~ould fiormally expect lower surge levels on lew-voltage
signal ~ircuits than on medium power control circuits aud even
less than on main pover distribution busses. Qne miyht thus
logically use Zener diodes ec individual circuit ~oards.
varistors en te~minal boards, and spark gaps on leads running to
Brims entry and exit points.
A summary of the advantages and disadvantages of the various
transient £rotective devices is given in Table C.1.
further information can be Obtained from the follouing sourceS:
I. E. G. Arrowsmith, "Lightning Discharges aDd Your
Equipment," Ihe EleGtroni~ ~ngineer, October 196&.
~. R. E. nuies. F. A. Fisher. "Techniques and Devices for
the Protection of Electrical and Electronic circuit.s
from Li~htning Iransients,l' General ElectIic Company,
Contract No. AF29(601)-S402, June 1963.
E. G. E. Morgan, V. A. B~5CCU~ W. H. Cordova et al.: "Pinal
~epG~t on the Evaluation of Surge Protective Devices for
§MP Ha~aening Applications." Autonetics, North American
Rockwell, £72-712/201. Contract No. F29601-72-C-0028,
December 1972.
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APPENDIX D
TRANSIENT LEVELS
Verification of the dbility of e1uipment to ~ithstand the
indirect effects of lightning will be provided through the
assignment of a se~ies of transient design levels and the
implementation of a series of transient proof tests conducted at
transient test levels which will generally he, but need not be,
identical to tae transient design levels.
The transient proof test is a test wherein currents, voltages, or
both, are injected into the interface terminals of avionics
~quipnent. The levels at which the proof test is conducted and
the transient levels to which the equipment is designed must be
appropriate for both the type of equipment under test and the
electro~agnetic environment to ~hich the equipment and wiring is
exp.:)s;eo.
Ccmpliance with the terms of this document will be assumed, if
the actual transients on interfacing cables are shown by analysis
or test to be lower, by a specified margin, than the transient
test level at which the transient proof t8st vas made or the
trdnsi~nt level to which the equipment was designed.
Transieht Design Levels
Tra"sient design levels will be different for different types of
equipment and will be based on lavels at which avionics equipment
can be reasonable expected to survive. It would, for example, be
unrealistic to place the same transient design level on a
sclenoid-operated actuator a~d a digital control unit. To do so
would probably requirF either unnecessary shielding of the wiring
to the actuator, or require unnecessarily complex protecti~e
circuits in the control unit.
Detprmining a realistic level for different typ~s of equip~ent
may involve test programs to determine actual susceptibility
levels. If such susceptibility levels have been deterMined, a
transient design level of a lover amplitude should be specified.
An estimate should be made of the differ~nce between the actual
susceptibility level and the assigned transient design level,
since this difference will be one of the factors determining the
ultimate margin rEquired during the Verification program.
If no measured susc~ptibility levels are known~ it may be
possible to estimate ~ susceptibility level and from that
determine an aFpropriate transient dQsign level. In such a ca~e,
the difference between the esti~at~d susceptibility level and the
D-',l
III
assigned transient design level should be greater than if the
selection ver~ based on measured susceptibility level. In other
cases, no informa~iob on susceptibility levels may be awailable,
and thus, it will be necessary to arbitrarily assign a transient
design level.
r~ansient Test Waveforms
The most commonly used type of transient test ~aveforms will be
of a damped oscillatory nature, as is shown in the (a) portion of
Figure 1-1. ~n ~lternative ~uveform is an overdamped or
exponential transient, as is shown in the (b) portio~ of figure
7-1. If an exponential transient is coupled into the circuit
under t.est by transf{jrmer coupling, there will ine'l!itably be a
backswing. The a~Flitude and duration of this backswing may be
left uncontrolled provided that the amplitude of the backsving is
less than 25 percent of the amplitude of the main pulse.
Margins
In each case, a margin shall be specified bet~een the transient
design level and the actual transient level permitted by the
cable system. The definition of mar9in shall be:
~argin = (decibel or dB) = 20 log I&gns!~ni-gg§jgn_~!gl
10 Actual transieat level
The required margin viII be a functior. of the criticali~1 of the
particular circuit and the degree of uncertainty in the analyses
of actual tra~sient levels and transient design lavels. The
required margin will be greater:
a. For the mor~ critical cireuit~.
b. For tha~ equipment in w~ich the actual performance of a
transient proof test is uaived.
c. for those cirr~~ts in «hieh the calculation of actual
transient ~~vels is the least precise.
The cequ~Led margins may b~ calculated oy the formula:
Ma~~in :expresscd in dB = X + Y + Z • 1)
~h~re X = A factor dependip.g on the criticality of the
circ~it
Y = A factor relating to the extent to which
ac~ual susceptibility is known in terms of
tb~ assigned transient design level.
D-3
Z A factor relating to the degree to ~hich the
actual transient level is known.
X or Criticality Factor
criticality level
criticality level 2
x 6 dB
3 dB
Criticality level 3 x = 0 dB
Y or susceptibility Pacto~
Difference between assigned transient
design level and susceptibility level
knou~ by actual test
Y = 6 dB minus actual
val ue expressed
in dB
Difference between assigned transient
design level and susceptibil~tJ le~el
estimated by analysis
y 6 dB minus one-half
estimated ~alue ex-
pressed in dB
Transient desi1n level assigned
arbit~~~ily - actual susceptibility
level unknown
Diffi2rence kn, .. ~_om susceptibi.li tj"
testing e but transient proof test
vaived.
Dif£e~ence estimated, but transient
proof test waived
Transient design level assigned
arbitrarily. actual susceptibility
level unk~c~il, transient proof
test waived
Z or Transient Level Factor
Y = 6 dB
v
= 9 dB minus actual...
value expressed
in dB
y
- 9 dB minus one-half
esti.lIlate,! value ex-
pressed in dB
'i" = 9 dB
Transient levels estimated only
from data given in hppendix F
z & dB
Transient levels estimated f.rom
detailed analysis, analysis not
~eviewed by Lightning Protection
COllmittee
Transient lev~ls estimated from
detailed analysis, analysis
reviewed and approved by
Lightning Protection committee
D-q
Z = 3 dB
Z = 0 dB
Transient levels known from loti
level injected current tests
with results scaled to full
lightning current level
Transient levels kno~n fLom full
scale injected current tests
Z ::: -3 dB
Z ::: -,6 dB
Transient design levels may be assigned in ter~s of either open-
circuii: voltages or short-cir.cuit current, as delivE!re'd from
sources having realistic ~Jltage, energy. and internal impeBauce
Levels. In some cases, either a voltage or current test may bo
inappropriate. A test specification that calls far an injected
current of 10 amperes tc be applied to a circuit terminated in a
high impedance (open relay contact, inductive solenoid coil, or
emit~er-followe£ circuit) would clearly be inappro~riate.
Ge~erally, a current test will be most appropriate for electronic
circuits, and a voltage test most appropriate for inducti~e
apparatus, tcansformers. motors, solenoids, etc. If the
apparatus is protected by a surge protective device, a combined
voltage and c~rrent test is appropri.ate; a voltage test to
demonstrate the voltage-limiti~g characteristics and a cu~rent
test to demonstrate tbe ability to handle the surge energj~
Actual Transient Levels
The calculation of actual transient levels that will appear on
cabie systems is a ~ask of sufficient complexity as to be beyond
the scope of this document. One ~pproach to determin~tion of
these actual transients is given in Appendix F.
~ethcds of Conducting Tests
Fundamental to the conuuct vi a t~~~zient proof test must be the
understanding that ~he transient gefierators used to inject
transients into terminals of apparatus must inject reasonable
amounts of power into those terminals. Tbis implies tbat
generators must employ voltage and stored-energy levels and have
inte~nal impedances appropriat.e to the voltage~ current g and
energy levels tbat lightning viII ~roduce on the cable systems.
Most com~only, the tcansi~nt proof test viII be performed on a
conmon mone or line-to-~£ound basis and on a complete ca~le
harness. In such a ca~e, the transient proof test may be made
using a tr~"sformer-coupling technique as sho~n on Figure D-1.
In some Cdses, it .ill be desirable to inject voltage3 on a line-
to-line basis. This may be dona using the techniaue shown on
Figure U-2. Transient proof tests may also be peiformed by
directly inse~ting current i~to the cable shields. Detailed
de~elopment of test techniques is beyond the scope of this
document. sa~ple work sheets for the assign~ent of transient
levels aD.4 margins are shown in Fig11res D-3 and n-4.
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TYPE EQUIPMENT
TYPE OF TERIVIIN.~LS UNDER TEST
EQUIPMENT MOST SUSCEPTABLE TO:
TYPE OF TEST TO BE MADE (Check as appropriate)
Voltage 0 Common mode 0 Oscillatory 0
Current 0 Line··to-line 0 Exponential 0
f :::
(Check as appropriate)
T1 = _
T
2
= _
Assigned level _
Design 0
Test CJ
CALCUlJ\TION OF REQUIRED MARGINS
Actual trans ient level factor (l)
Estimated from apfendix F CZ == 6d1B)
Known by analysis (l = 3dB)
Known by analysis plus review (Z =OdS)
Low level surge teit <Z = -3dB}
High level surge test (l =6dB)
Susceptability facto' (Y)
Known by test (Y ::: 6dBminus actual value) §
Known by analysi:; (Y = 6dB minus one-half estimated value)
Unknown (Y ::: 6dB)
Transient proof te'it waived
NO WeB) B
YES (,l,dd 3dB to value of Y)
~
Require margin X + Y + Z :::
Figul'e 0-4 Saniple work sheet for transient level assignmellts.
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APPENDIX E
TEST WAVEFORMS DESCRIPTIONS
A severe lightning current waveform ~odel has been defined for
the Space Shuttle as a design ~Gquire~ent and included in
Appendix A of this documept~ The ~eproduction of this complete
waveform would be expensive ~r.d difficult, therefore, some
simplified test ~aveforms are prescribed for. demonstrating
compliance ~itb the severe model requirements. These waveforms
are basGd primarily on standarn practice at aircraft lightning
laboratories. The waveforms have tole~~~ces that are
intentionally broad so that more than just a fe~ laboratories can
produce them. They do represent moderate to severe lightning
effects.
Par test purposes, a natural lightning discharge may he arbi-
trarily divided into higb-, intermediate-, and low-current
components, and high current rate-af-rise, all of which have
different damage effects.. Each part of an aerospace vehicle may
be vulnerable to one OJ: nor.e specific lightning curl:ent
components. High-voltage ~aveforms are used to check dielectric
puncture and attachment points.
The voltage and current test va~eforms are generated by using
capacitor banks in various series and pal:allel combinations.
Most of the effects of lightning are ~eproduced by these
waveforms.
The test waveforms, illostrated in rigure 1-1, are in general
terms. Specific waveforms applicable to the various phases of
the test pro9r~m include:
a. Full Scale Testing - Total vehicle test phases
(pri~arily fo~ assessment of indirect effects).
1. l'ast '\fa~/e - A damped oscillatory waveform (Figure 7-
I) at a frequency, f, of 100 (±50 percent) kilohertz
~ith an amplitude, A, of 10 (±10 percent)
kiloamperes. This component, particularly with its
front of wave firing transients, simulates the
higher frequency compcnents in the lightning dis-
charge high current return stroke.
2. Slav wave - A damped oscillatory 'Jlaveforo:a (Figllre 7-
1) at a frequency, f, of 2 U50 percent) kilohertz
with an amplitude, A, of 20 (±10 percent)
kiloamperes. This component simulates the lover
frequency components in the lightning discharge.
£-2
3. Unidirectional wave - A generally exponential
wavp.form (Figure 7-1) that most closely simulates a
natural lightning st~oke waveform g with a virtual
front time" tl, of 2 (±50 percent) microseconds and
~ time to 50 percent of crest on the tail, t2 v of 50
(±50 percent) microseconds, with an amplitude. A, of
,00 amperes or greater. Induced voltages resulting
from this waveform mu~t be extrapolated to full
threat levels.
b~ Component Testing
1. High current &ate-of-rate (for assessment of
indirect effectsj - A damped oscillatory waveform
(Figure 7~ I) at a frequency, f, of 250 (±20 percent)
kilobertz with an average rate-of-rise during the
first quarter cycle of 100,000 (±50 percent) amperes
per microsecond.
2. High current (for such direct effects as sparking,
magnetic force, shock ~ave, and for assessment of
indirect effects) - A damped oscillatory waveform
(Figure 7'·1) "ith a. frequency, f, of 10 (t~jO
percent) Kilobertz, and an amplitude, A, of 200,OnO
(±10 percent) amperes, except when st~oke sweeping
effects preclude the probability of more than one
stroke entering at one place, in which case, the
current be~ond the first half cycle may be deleted.
3. Intermediate current (for such direct effects as
slow pr~ssure buildUp and metal skin puncture) - An
exponential waveform (Figure 7-1) with an amplitude,
A, of 5000 (:tlO percent) amperes and 1 by 3 (±30
percent) millisecondl waveform (t"' = 1 millisecond
and t2 = 3 milliseconds).
4. Long-duration continuing currents (for direct skin
puncture effects) - A rectangular waveform (not
illustrated) at 400 (±10 percent) amperes dc with a
duration of 0.4 (±10 percent) second. Where it ~ay
be shown by analysis or demonstrated by test that
the long duration current will not remain attached
ta one vart or component on the Shuttle composite
vehicle for the full 0.4 second specified above, the
duration may be reduced to the indicated attached
time.
6. ~ high-voltage waveform (for such direct effects as
dielectric puncture and arc attachment studies)
applied at a rate-af-rise of 1000 tv per miccosecond
(:t50 percent) across an air gap set so that
flashover to the test piece occurs on the wavefront.
This w veform would be similar to tbat shown in the
E-3
(b) portion of Figure 7-1, but probably limited by
dielectric breakdown prior to time t1.
The test waveform would be used for the effects described in the
parentheses.
Deviations or interpretations should be referred to the Lightning
Protection committee.
1. To simulat~ the second return or sUbsequent strokes
in the lightning flash, the high current rate-of-
rise and the high current component ~aveforms in
paragraphs b.l and b.2 may be reduced to one-fourth,
and the intermediate current component vaveform in
paragraph b.3 may be reduced to one-half.
{Reference A-1).
c. Lo~ Level components and Subsystem Level Testing - Cur-
rents and voltages induced in cables may he either. of a
damped oscillato~y nature, similar to that shown in the
(a) portion of Figure 1-1, or of an exponential nature,
similar to that sho~n in the !b} pcrtion of Fi9u~e 1-1.
Test curr~nts and ~oltages induced into cables by
transformer coupling techniques will generally include a
backsving. The backswing may generally be ignored if
its ampli~ude is less than 25 percent of the initial
amplitude. The choice of waveform and defining
parameters of the waveform must he made as part of the
Frocess of assigning transient design levels and the
conduct at transient proof tests.
OTHER WAVEFORM DEFINITIONS
SOIDe terms frequently used in refereDce to simulated lightning
test waveforms follow. These are excerpts f~c~ the USA and IEEE
standard "Techniques for Dielectric Tests." USA.C68.1 and IEEE
No. ij define waveform parameters for the last three non-
oscillatory components. The paragraph numhers refer to the USA
and IEEE document numbers.
58.1.3 Vi~tna! Front_Timg. The virtual tront time t1 is de-
fined as 1.25 times the interval between the instants
when the impUlse current is 10 percent and 90 percent
of the peak value.
If oscillations a~e present on the front, the 10 percent
and 90 percent values should he derived from the meaTh
curve drawn through these oscillations.
E-4
5B.l.4
'}E.1.5
5D .. 1.6
!ir!..!!~LQ£g1!l_.Ql. The virtual or-grin 01 of an impulse
is defined as the instant preceding that corresponding
to the time at which the c~rrent is 10 percent of the
peak value by 0.1 t2.
For oscillograms na'Ji:'lg linear timf~ sweeps, this is th,~
intersection with the abscissa of a straight line drawn
through the 10 percent and 90 percent reference points on
the front.
Virtual Time to Half Value t2. The virtual time to half
value-Is-the~Ime-Int~al~etweenthe virt~al or~g1n
and the instant on the tail, where the current has de-
creased to half the peak value.
v i !!.Y§:!_!lgM,1mLQ.:.L.s_!!~~1S!tg,Y!ItX;:._ I mQ.\!!§L£YI.rgn!,. The
virtual duration of a rectangular impulse current is defined
by the time during which the current is greater than 90
percent of the peak value.
SA.l.l
SA.1.3
SA.l.S
FU!!=!~.!!!§£-!Ql1sg~. A fUll-impulse voltage is ideally
an aperiodic transient voltage that ~ises ~apidly to a
maximum value and falls usually less rapidly to zero.
gg~l-Ial.!!gL-!11ern~11!~11-1irtua~_R~~!-Y~Y~.The peak
value is normally the maximum value. With soge test cir-
cuits, oscillations or overshoot may be present on the
voltage. If the amplitude of the oscillations is not
greater than 5 percent of ~he peak value and the frequency
is at least 0.5 megahertz, OL alternatively, if the
amplitu~e of the overshoot is not greater than 5 perc'p-nt
of the peak value and the dura~ion not longer than 1
microsecond, then for the purpose of measurement a mean
curve may be drawu~ the maximum amplitude of which is
defined as the peak value.
Virtual Front time t. The virtual front time t is
deiIned--as-l~57~imes the time interval t tetveen the
instants ~hen th~ impulse is 30 percent and gO percent
of the peak value. If oscillations are present on the
front, the mean cu~ve should be d~awn through the oscil-
lations.
Virtual_OrigjH!-.Q,_2!:_s.!!_!..!.E~'§~. The virtual orgill 0 of an
i~pluse is defined as the instant preceding that corres-
ponding to poiut A by a time 0.3 t. For oscillograms
having linear time sweeps, tbis is the inte~~ection vith
the abscissa of a straight line drawn through the ref-
erence points on the front.
r:-5
SA 1. 6
5A.1.7
.!ll.!!H!L!:.2~_2! Ri§~LJRI!l-2L!~l~.!!!.Thevirtual rate
of rise (RR) of the f~ont is the quotient of the peak
vQlue and the virtual front time.
Victual Time to Half Value t. The virtual tim€. to half
v'~lnet-of-anImpulse-'Is-thet~.me interval between. the
virtual origin and the instant on the tai1 6 when the
voltage has decreased to half peak value.
Further information may be obtained from the following
sources:
a. Standard nTechniques for Dielectric Tests" OSA
e68.1. IEEE No. ij, 1968 IEEE - 3115 East 47th
street, New York, N Y 10017.
b. J. D. Robb, R. F. Htber and C. J. Kaviecki,
Lightning Test Facilities and Measurements
Techniques," USAF Avionics Laboratories, Wright-
Patterson AFB, Ohio, proceedings, 1910 Lightning and
Static Electric Conforence, Decemhe~ 1970, San
Diego, California.
c. B. H. Evans and J. Phillpott, "Lightning simulation
and Testing in Relation to Specification MIL-n-S081-
B," 0roceedings, 1912 Lightni~g and static
Elec";:ricity ConferencH, Decell',ber 12, 1972, Las
Vega:.;, NevCl.da.
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APPENDIX F
MAGNETIC FIELDS, CONDUCTOR CURRENTS, AND
CONDUCTOR VOLTAGES WITHIN DIFFERENT ZONtS
OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE
A lig~tning strike to tbe Space Sh~ttle viII produce
electromagnetic fields ~ithin the vehicle. The ~agnitude and
waveshape of these fields will be dependent upon the current
amplitude and waveshape of the lightning strike, the point on the
vehicle that is struck, and upon the degree of electromagnetic
shielding offered by the ve~icle. External to the vehicle, there
vill be both intense p.lectric and ~a9netic fields~ but inside the
vehicle the magnetic fields will predominate. The electric
fields will be ~egligible except near apertures. The magnetic
fields ~ill also be high neaT- apertures.
The magnetic fields, if they pass between a cable and the vehicle
structure, will induce a common-mode voltage batveen the
conductors of the cable and the vehicle structure. The voltage
will depend upon th~ magnetic field intensity, the rate of change
of tha~ magnetic field, the cable length~ the spacing between th8
cable and vehicle structure, and the shielding of the cable.
T~is induced ~oltage may either appear in the form of a voltage
across open contacts, or may cause a CU~Lent to circulate through
cable shields or low-impedance input circuits. Whether or not
damage or malfunction occurs depends on the amplitude and
~~veshape of these voltages and currents, and on the type of
device upon which the voltage appears or through vhich the
currents circulate. Evaluation of these fislds, voltages,
currents, and effects is a difficult and co~p18x task, and if
pursued r.ign£oll.sly lIould bp. quite expensive and time consumi.ng.
In order that initial specifications regarding avionics equipment
for the Space Shuttle may be defined, an analysis has been made
of the expected magnetic fields vithin different regions of th€
Orbiter and of the open-circuit voltage or short-circuit current
that May be induced by such fields. They are believed to be
conservative, but representative of the effects produced by
severe lightning strikes. If application of these data indicate
a severe compatibility probl~~ leading to severe cost or weight
penalties, further analysis is warranted.
Figure P-1 shovs the different regions within the structure that
were considered in this analysise These are:
Zone 1 - flight deck
Z~ne 2 - center equipment bay
F-2
Zone 3 - 10liler equipment bay
Zone 4 - forward top
Zone S
-
fClI:l:a l:d center
'Zone 6
-
payload bay
Zone ...
-
aft equipment bay,
Zone 8 - engine compartment
Zone (} - vertical stabilizer-
Zone 10 - wing
The magnetic fields within the stkucture will be different
depending upon the point at which the lightning arc attaches to
the structut"e 6 and upon the mecnanism by which the magnetic
fields couple to the inside of the structure. Coupling may be
either through apertures or by diffusion through the metal skin.
An example of an important apertuce is through the windshield
into the flight deck, Zone 1. This aperture coupling is
particularly important for a strikp- near the top of the
windshield, shown as strike B iL Figure F-1.
The fields in the di f.ferent zones can be represented as the
direct superposition of two components, one due to aperture
coupling, component A, and one due to diffusion coupling,
component B. component l b~s a waveform the same as that uf the
incident lightning current while the component B has a ~&veshape
with longer rise and fall times than the incident lightni~9
curren~. The ~~~esh~pe of component A is t~e same for tbe
different zones. This is also true fo~ the ~~~e~hape of
component B. The amplitudes of the two components are not
assumed to be related. The vaveshapes of the two coreponeuts are
shown in Figure F-2, while the amplitudes are shown in Table F.1.
If only common-mode voltages are considered and only cable
systems short enough that transmission line effects need not he
considered 6 the induced voltage will be:
e ::: d:>/dt = JJ.
o ~ dR/dt •••• • • Q • • ~)
where A = area ~f the loop involved - ~eter2
JJ.o = ~~ X 10-7 - ne~rY/meter (permeability of free space)
~ = total flux linked in webers
H = magnetic filed intensity in amperes/meter
F-3
t. -- seconds
e = ?olts
expressed in inch ~nits
e = 8.11 x 10-10 x 1 x h dH/dt •
where 1 = lengtb of cable bundle - inches
• • III • • • III ?~
h = height above ground plane - inch<:!s
H = ampeces/meter
t = seconds
It must be emphasized that the voltage so calculated is that
existing between the entire group of conductors (comprising the
cable) and the vehicle structure. The waltage will divide
~etween the loads at the ends of the cable inversely as the
impedance of the loads. For worst. case ati~lysis6 consider one
end o£ thr; cable grounded with the other end open circuited. All
the voltage so developed viII appear at the open-circuit end of
the cable.
Line-ta-line or circuit voltages will be less, generally by a
factor of 10 to 200 or 20 to 40 dB do~n from the common-mode
voltages because individual conductors are usually close together
and are often twisted, thus reducing the total loop area.
The maximum cable current is that which flows When both ends of
the cable are connected to the vehicle structure through a lou or
zero impedance. Such an i~pedance may be an overall shield
grounded at each end or it may be a group of semiconductor
circuits, each having low input impedance. In the first case,
the current viII flow on the overall shield uith the current on
the input circuits ~etermined by the shielding properties of the
shield. In the second case, the current will flow directly
through the input semiconductors and thetr bias sources.
F-I~
The short circuit current that flows may be deter-mined from th~
familiar expression
e == L di/dt ....
whence i 1/L f ed t
i -= amperes
. ~ . ..
. .
3}
4)
L == self-inductance of cable in henries
e -= open circuit induced voltage in volts
t -= time in seconds
Cable inductance may be estimated from the expressi~n
or
L == 2 X 10- 7 log ~h
e d
5.08 X 10-9 log 4h
e d
henries/meter .. • .. .. " .. .. • 5)
henries/inch .. .. • .. • • .. .. • 6)
lihere h = height above a ground plans
d = conductor diameter
The induced voltage p e, which drives the current is proportional
to the cable height, but the cable inductance which impedes the
flow of current is proportional to the logarithm of the cable
l\eight ..
Cab12 voltages and cu'crents calculated as above are given in
Figures P-] and p-q respectively. The paramaters used in the
calulations are basecl upon the lighttlL.19 model described in
Appennix A.
P-5
Tabl~ P.l Magnetic Fields Ir. Differ-ent Zones Of
The structure
"'-_.._---------_._- ---------- ._--..--------------------------'---------,
I I Aperture couplin']
I Zone I A·-component, amperes/meter
1----·---1---·--------- -------.-- ... --- ---
i 1
! 1 1 1200
2 60
3 0
~ 50
5 50
6 280
7 50
8 200
CJ 200
10 65
Diffusion coupling I
a-component, amperes/meter I
------------------------------1
I
800 I
I
200 I
I
200 I
I
150 I
I
100 I
I
300 (payload) I
150 (no pa)"load) 1
I
570 1
1
680 I
1
3700 I
I
300 I
I
~--~-------~-------~--------~--------------------------------------~
NOTE: The above field levels are to be used for preliminary design
effort only. Apertures within the var10US zones shall be
consideLed when establishing the field levels for final resign.
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(a) Lightn ing current
--- See table F-1 for amplitude
(b) Aperture coupled field, A-component
/" -- See table F-l for amplitude
,,/ I
/" :
4?/ _. ,--'!L...-..- ,_~
300 x 10-6sec I
•
600 x lO-6sec
(c) Diffusicln coupled field, B-component
Figure F-2 Waveforms of apertur(: and diffusion coupled magnetic fields.
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1\ PPENDIX G
GLOS5AHY OF TERMS
Adverse effects
&rc attachment point
Air terminal
Attenuation
Bearing assembly
Cable
cable ladder or
ca~le tray
APPENOIX G
GLOSSAEY OF TERMS
Adverse effects ace defined as those
conditions tnat damage ~quipIDent
required for safe operation of the
vehicle; causes ~alfunction o~
inadvertent operation of equipment or
systems required Eor continued safe
operation of the vehicle; requires
immediate action by tbe crew to assess
and/or correct for damage or
malfunction during time critical flight
phases {i.e., launch, ascent,
atmosphe~ic recovery, approach, and
lanJing through rollout); aud causes
electromagnetic coupling ubich
annunciates fault status requiring crew
assessment.
The point or points at which a
lightning channel attaches to a
~etallic surface.
The combination of elevation rad with
tip or point if used, and brace, or
footing placed on upper portions of
structure to intercept lightning
strokes.
Reduction in magnitude of an electric
or magnetic field, a cu~rent, or a
voltage expressed in decibels, where
attenuation (dB) : 20 log Ql
10 Q2
Q : current or voltage
A g~oup of individual bearings which
support a single movable structure.
Any quantity of eler-trieal ~ires
grouped together to for~ a single
bundle.
Refers to standard supporting me~bers
for signal and pover Gable groups.
G-2
Cable shield
Cone of pro~ection
Criticality category
Any metallic covering on a single
(coaxial) or multiple conductor cable.
The shield can take the form of tiuned
or untinned copper braid, wrapped foil
tape, or a lead jacket.
This term refe~s to the volume of a
cone in which objec~s are very unlikely
to be struck di~ectly by lightning.
The cone of protection of a grounded
air terminal oc mast of conducting
material is the space enclosed by a
cone, vhich bas its apex at the highest
point of the air terminal or mast and a
radius at the base which is a function
of the mast height. A 1:1 cone has a
base radius equal to its height d and a
2:1 cone has a base radius equal to
twice its height.
Criticality categories are defined as
follows:
Catego~l
1
2
3
Loss of life or vehicle
Loss of mission
All othe~
E-Ground (Equipnent)
Plash
I-Ground
(Instrumentation)
Kargin
A grounding net~o~k which is grounded
to earth at se~eral points. (Building
structural steel is a common eIample cf
an E-ground netuork.)
The total series of electrical and
luminous effects comprising a single
lightning phenomenon. Typically, the
duration of a fl~sh is several tenths
of a second.
A grounding net York which is completely
isolated tram earth ground exc~pt at
one reference tie point. A system may
contain several I-grounds, all
separate. (Ideally, all I-grounds of a
system should connect to E-ground at
one common point.)
The required ratio, expressed in dB,
between the transient design level and
the actua1 transient level ~bich
lightning is expected to produce on the
i~terconnecting .iring.
G-3
May
Return stroke
Second or subsequent
return stroke
Shall
Should
Stroke
Terminal equipment
Transient design level
Transient proof test
Por this document, may is used in the
permissive sense.
Anyone of the high current, brightly
luminous, upward-moving surges, that
OCCUT. during a cloud-to-ground flash.
Upward moving retuLU strokes are
preceded by a downward moving leader
streamer from cloud-to-ground~
A high ~urrent or intermediate current
impulse in an e2isting lightning channel.
For this document, shall is used in the
mandatory sense.
For this document, should i.s used in
the recommended sense.
Anyone of the major electrical and
luminous effects, the entire series of
uhich make up the lightning flash.
Typically, stroke duration is much less
than a millisecond. ~any authors
restrict the term "stroke" to the
"return stroke" of the cloud-to-ground
flash.
Any type of electrical equipment
interfacing with an electrical
conductor - any electrical conductor
thus interfaces with two pieces of
terminal equipment, one at each end.
A level at which a transient proof test
is made. The transient design level
specification includes the amplitUde at
which the test is made and the
frequency of an oscillatory transient,
or the time to the crest as well as the
decay of an exponential wave.
A test in ~hich curr~nt or voltage
transients are injected into terminals
of electrical equipment to prove that
adverse effects are not encountered.
G-4
